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As its title indicates, the paper by Jane Little and Robert Triest deals
with the impact of some upcoming demographic changes on the U.S.
labor market. The two changes highlighted are the well-documented
population aging and immigration. According to the paper, the chal-
lenges raised by these changes are rising and high old-age dependency
ratios because of declining numbers of workers to retirees, and slower
productivity growth, since migrants tend to have less education than the
native-born.
I would only have quibbles, not quarrels, with their clear and
balanced description of these future demographic trends, which relies
mainly on Census projections. On both immigration and population
aging, however, I believe that better estimates are available than those of
the Census. But these superior estimates would still project a future labor
force much like the one foreseen in the Little/Triest paper.
The one quibble I will mention is the hint in the paper that
immigration can have a signiﬁcant impact on the dependency ratio, since
it would be much higher if immigration were zero. But we are no more
going to have zero immigration in our future than immigration at rates
three times current immigration. If we examine instead immigration
either 50 percent higher or lower than current levels (which I think safely
bounds the likely policy adjustments), our recent projections for the
National Academy of Science indicate a variation in the overall depen-
dency rate of less than 2 percentage points (Smith and Edmonston 1997).
I think the standard conclusion that immigration is not a demographic ﬁx
for issues related to population aging is still pretty safe.
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concerns their speculations about some possible adjustments to these
demographic changes. The ﬁrst adjustment concerns possible increases in
productivity induced by low growth rates of the working-age population.
In a nutshell, the argument is that these low population growth rates
lower the growth rates in the numbers of workers, which in turn will raise
real wages and thereby encourage labor-saving technology. A series of
regression models are presented in the paper showing surprisingly
strong negative correlations between population growth rates and pro-
ductivity growth.
At least for the past few decades, it may not be surprising that this
association exists. With the baby boom entrants coming into the labor
force, population growth was more rapid in the 1970s and mid 1980s,
while the economy was stagnant. In contrast, in the 1990s, population
growth slowed and the economy was vibrant if not booming. But should
we interpret this association as causal, a consequence of population
trends?
I think there is ample good reason for skepticism about this result, a
skepticism that I believe the authors in part share. Their result goes
beyond the simple effects of weighting of the population by the young or
more educated as population size shifts. If you think that the origins of
the recent economic growth and productivity gains of the 1990s are in
computer technology (as I do), then are we actually claiming that the
advances in the computer sector were due to a slowdown in population
growth? This seems beyond a stretch to me. Similarly, oil shocks are
usually the ﬁrst candidates mentioned for the slowdown in the 1970s.
These oil shocks were certainly not the consequence of population trends.
Population growth rates are long-run and forecastable. Even if the
mechanism outlined in the paper were plausible, why should the capital
investments await the arrival of these smaller or larger cohorts of
workers?
The second adjustment discussed in the paper involves immigration.
The concern expressed is that since immigrants are less educated than the
native-born, this will be a force leading to lower productivity growth.
This concern about immigrant education appears in two forms. First-
generation education levels are much lower than those for native-born
workers. Second, especially for Latino or Mexican immigrants, these
education gaps persist and may even grow across generations. It is
argued that educational progress beyond the second generation seems
particularly slow for these groups.
I have both theoretical and factual problems with the section on
immigration. The theoretical problem concerns the reasons for host
country economic gains from immigration. Domestic workers gain from
immigration because immigrants are different. If they were simply clones
of domestic workers, we would just be scaling the economy up or down
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different from us by having much more education or by having much
less. Thus, less educated or less skilled immigrant workers increase total
domestic incomes; they do not decrease them. At current levels of
immigration, these increases in domestic incomes relative to the size of
the economy may well be small, but they are positive, in part because
immigrants have lower education levels than domestic workers do.
If we put this argument in a growth context, these gains will persist
only if immigrants stay different. They can do this in two ways: First, their
fertility rates can remain higher than those of the native-born, and
second, education or skill differences can persist across generations. The
ﬁrst can be easily dismissed. Immigration apparently is an extremely
effective contraceptive, and by the third generation all fertility differences
have essentially disappeared. I will deal below with the empirical validity
of the contention that generational progress in immigrants’ education is
slow. Here I want to note that only if it is slow will there be any effect on
long-run growth rates of the economy. The very thing that Little and
Triest worry about is what produces the positive impact of immigrants on
growth.
Let me come to the factual questions on which I will now quarrel
rather than quibble. On the issue of immigrant skills, I believe current
perspectives are too inﬂuenced by changes induced by the country-of-
origin provisions of the 1965 Immigration Act. These changes are the ones
that have dominated the analysis in the literature as well. A fair summary
of that literature is that the skills of immigrants are less than those of the
native-born and this gap has been growing. In my opinion this view is
extremely dated, and the trends have been decidedly in the opposite
direction for about ﬁfteen years. Across all immigrants, the education gap
with natives is almost nonexistent, and immigrant skills have been
increasing faster than those of the native-born. Among legal immigrants
alone, immigrants have more skill and education than domestic workers
do (Jasso, Rosenzweig, and Smith 2000).
Similarly, the view that there is a serious problem concerning
generational assimilation, especially among Latino immigrants, is also in
my opinion factually incorrect. The origin of these commonly held beliefs
is a consequence of examining educational progress of immigrants by
their generation status. If we look at people at about the same age, a
reasonable summary of the data shows signiﬁcant educational progress
between the ﬁrst and second generations, and little progress at all
between the second and subsequent generations. While this is the
common way such data are assembled, it leads to an incorrect conclusion.
The reason is that members of the ﬁrst generation are on average the
fathers and mothers of the second generation and the grandparents of the
third generation. Consequently, the generations cannot possibly be the
same age. Instead, the data must be arranged so the ﬁrst generation is
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generation 25 years older than the third. When the education data by
generation are arrayed in this more appropriate way, the progress in
schooling achievements across generations is substantial, even among
Latino immigrant groups (Smith 2001). While this ﬁnding is not an excuse
for complacency about the real educational issues surrounding immi-
grant children, it does suggest that we should not be overly pessimistic
about the future.
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